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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Kathleen M. Victorelli appeals an award of summary 
judgment to her former employer, Shadyside Hospital 
("Shadyside"), on her claim that Shadyside violated the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.S 2601 
("FMLA").2 For the reasons discussed below, we will vacate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On March 3, 1995, this case was referred by the district court to the 
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and Local 
Rule 72.1.3. The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation, 
recommending that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be 
granted and that the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment be 
denied. On July 25, 1996, the report and recommendation was adopted 
by the district court. All references herein to the district court refer 
concurrently to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and 
to the district court's adoption of it. 
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the grant of summary judgment and remand this case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
From June 17, 1989, until August 1, 1994, Kathleen M. 
Victorelli was employed as a Central Service Technician by 
Shadyside Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. She was 
terminated from her employment with Shadyside following 
a request for sick leave on July 29, 1994. According to 
Victorelli's deposition, on the preceding evening she 
experienced stomach upset with vomiting and diarrhea. At 
4:30 a.m. on the 29th, Victorelli called the hospital and left 
a voice mail message informing her supervisor that she 
would be unable to work because of her stomach ailment. 
Victorelli called again at 9:00 a.m. to inform another 
supervisor, Janet Lattanzio, of her inability to work that 
day. Lattanzio was unable to speak with Victorelli at that 
time and suggested she call again at approximately 1:30 
p.m. In the interim, Victorelli spoke with her doctor, I.N. 
Adoki, M.D. Dr. Adoki's opinion was that Victorelli was 
suffering from a "flare-up" of her peptic ulcer disease. He 
recommended that she not work that day. Victorelli spoke 
with Lattanzio again at 1:30 p.m. and said she was having 
stomach discomfort because of her peptic ulcer condition. 
Victorelli also told Lattanzio that she was scheduled to meet 
with her doctor about her condition on August 2 and that 
she would be in to work on July 30. Lattanzio responded 
that they would discuss Victorelli's absence on Monday, 
August 1. 
 
As a result of Victorelli's July 29 "call-off " from work, 
Shadyside decided to terminate her employment. Lattanzio 
made this decision after consultation with another hospital 
official on the morning of the 29th but did not 
communicate it to Victorelli until August 1. Victorelli did 
report to work as scheduled on July 30 and August 1. On 
August 1, Victorelli was informed that she had been 
terminated pursuant to the hospital's progressive 
disciplinary policy. Lattanzio told Victorelli that she was 
being discharged because of previous attendance problems 
and what was considered to be an abuse of sick time. 
Victorelli had had a history of tardiness and absences due 
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to sickness, some in excess of her accrued sick time. She 
had been warned about this on numerous occasions. 
 
Throughout her tenure with Shadyside, Victorelli was 
given high marks in her job evaluations. She had also, 
however, received written warnings for her tardiness and 
absenteeism. In March of 1993, Victorelli was counseled by 
her supervisor regarding her absenteeism and an apparent 
pattern of "Monday-Friday" absences due to sickness. As 
part of Shadyside's progressive disciplinary program, 
Victorelli was given her first verbal warning regarding her 
attendance in April of 1993. On May 2, 1994, Victorelli 
received a warning for tardiness. On May 18, she was given 
another written warning about her absences. The May 18 
warning stated that any subsequent attendance violations 
would result in her dismissal. 
 
Dr. Adoki first saw Victorelli on March 16, 1988. In 
March of 1990, he began treating her for recurring stomach 
pain, diagnosed as gastritis. He saw her again on August 
13, 1992, because of stomach pain and additional 
symptoms of nausea and vomiting. He then prescribed 
Zantac for her condition. She continues to take Zantac to 
the present day. On November 18, 1992, Dr. Adoki 
diagnosed peptic ulcer disease. He has treated Victorelli on 
June 23, 1993, August 2, 1994, May 30, 1995, and 
November 16, 1995, because of peptic ulcer disease 
problems that could not be controlled by Zantac. Dr. Adoki 
has also spoken with Victorelli on numerous occasions 
regarding her condition. He has found that Victorelli's 
peptic ulcer disease is incurable although it can be 
generally controlled by medication. He has determined that, 
if left untreated, Victorelli's condition would cause a period 
of incapacity in excess of three days. He has also found 
that, while treated, Victorelli's condition has occasionally 
prevented her from working, including on July 29, 1994. 
 
Over the course of her employment, Victorelli has 
informed her employer that she suffers from peptic ulcer 
disease. She also has had recurring cases of sinusitus and 
inner ear infections. While Shadyside knew of these various 
medical ailments, at no time did it seek medical 
documentation of them. Upon request, Victorelli has, except 
for one occasion, provided a doctor's excuse for her 
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illnesses. In her deposition testimony, Janet Lattanzio, 
Victorelli's supervisor, stated that she believed Victorelli 
was sick when she reported in as such. Lattanzio also 
testified that she did not believe that Victorelli reported off 
sick when she was not indeed sick.3 
 
Victorelli contends that Shadyside Hospital violated the 
FMLA when it terminated her employment because of her 
absence on July 29, 1994. The district court granted 
Shadyside's motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Victorelli failed to establish she had a "serious health 
condition" pursuant to FMLA requirements; for that reason 
she was not protected by the FMLA during this absence. 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction over Victorelli's 
case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 2617 (a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction over Victorelli's appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a grant of summary judgment by the district court and 
apply the same test that the district court should have 
applied. A. Marzano v. Computer Science Corp. Inc., CSC, 91 
F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)); Fedorczyk v. 
Carribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 
1996); Healy v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 
130 (3d Cir. 1996). A district court's interpretation of a 
federal regulation is a question of law subject to plenary 
review. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1995); 
ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
II. 
 
The district court evaluated Victorelli's claims under the 
FMLA based upon an interim final rule, promulgated by the 
Department of Labor in June 1993, effective August 5, 
1993, which was still in effect on July 29, 1994. The parties 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
which determines whether a person may receive benefits after being 
discharged from employment, found that Victorelli had not participated 
in any willful misconduct relative to her absences and had offered ample 
justification for her sick leave usage, and as such her benefits could not 
be denied. (Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 
Ref. Decision, Oct. 5, 1994.) 
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do not dispute that the interim final rule applies, and we 
agree. The course of events and applicable facts in the 
instant case occurred before the final regulations were 
adopted and therefore we find that the interimfinal rule 
governs in this case. See Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther 
Corp., 1997 WL 369522, *4 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); Manuel 
v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761 n. 2 (5th Cir. 
1995) (finding that a dispute occurring before the release of 
the final regulations is governed by the interim regulations.) 
However, we will refer to the final rule promulgated in 
January 1995, effective February 6, 1995, as an aid to 
interpret the interim final rule. See United States Steel 
Corporation v. Oravetz, 686 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(finding that a claim filed before the effective date of the 
final rules should still be interpreted by thefinal rules to 
the extent it is appropriate.) 
 
III. 
 
Shadyside was awarded summary judgment because the 
district court determined that Victorelli did not suffer a 
"serious health condition" under the provisions of the 
FMLA. We begin by reviewing the protective sphere of the 
FMLA as applied to Victorelli to determine (1) whether 
Victorelli has a "serious health condition" protected by the 
FMLA, and (2) whether Victorelli was terminated for taking 
FMLA protected leave. In doing so, we will examine"serious 
health condition" as defined under both the controlling 
interim final rule and the final rule. 
 The FMLA was enacted to provide leave for workers 
whose personal or medical circumstances necessitate leave 
in excess of what their employers are willing or able to 
provide. 29 C.F.R. S 825.101. "Eligible" employees of a 
covered employer are allowed to take up to 12 weeks of 
leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a 
child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has 
a serious health condition. 29 C.F.R. S 825.100(a). More 
specifically, the FMLA applies when an employee's own 
serious health condition makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of his or her job. 29 U.S.C. 
S 2612(a)(1)(D). Employees who take leave pursuant to the 
statute are entitled to return to the same or equivalent 
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position and benefits as they had had previously. An 
employer who denies an employee these entitlements is in 
violation of the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. SS 2614(a)(1), 2615(a); 29 
C.F.R. S 825.100(c). 
 
The district court found Victorelli to be an employee 
otherwise "eligible" for protection under the FMLA. We 
agree. The district court concluded, however, that 
Victorelli's condition was a "minor" one, not intended to be 
protected by the FMLA. (R & R 10-14) After our review of 
the applicable provisions of the FMLA, we disagree with the 
district court's conclusion that as a matter of law the 
condition was a "minor" one. 
 
A. "Serious Health Condition": 
 
The interim final rule defines a "serious health condition" 
as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental 
condition that involves (1) a period of incapacity requiring 
inpatient care, (2) a period of incapacity of more than three 
calendar days, involving continuing treatment by a health 
care provider, or: 
 
        (3) Continuing treatment by (or under the 
       supervision of) a health care provider for a chronic or 
       long-term health condition that is incurable or so 
       serious that, if not treated, would likely result in a 
       period of incapacity of more than three calendar days; 
       or for prenatal care. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 825.114(a). Using the interimfinal rule, the 
district court found subsection (3) applicable to Victorelli 
because she was subject to "continuing treatment" by Dr. 
Adoki. (R & R 10.) We agree. However, the district court 
then found that Victorelli could not satisfy any of the 
requirements of "continuing treatment" of S 825.114(b)(1) or 
(2) except under what the court considered to be "an 
expansive reading of the statute." For this reason, the court 
determined that Victorelli did not have a "serious health 
condition." 
 
Under the interim final rule, "continuing treatment" is 
defined as: 
 
        (b) "Continuing treatment by a health care provider" 
       means one or more of the following: 
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       (1) The employee or family member in question is 
       treated two or more times for the injury or illness 
       by a health care provider. Normally this would 
       require visits to the health care provider or to a 
       nurse or physician's assistant under direct 
       supervision of the health care provider. 
 
       (2) The employee of family member is treated for 
       the injury or illness two or more times by a 
       provider of health care services (e.g., physical 
       therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a 
       health care provider, or is treated for the injury or 
       illness by a health care provider on at least one 
       occasion which results in a regimen of continuing 
       treatment under the supervision of the health care 
       provider - for example, a course of medication or 
       therapy - to resolve the health condition. 
 
       (3) The employee or family member is under the 
       continuing supervision of but, not necessarily being 
       actively treated by a health care provider due to a 
       serious long-term or chronic condition or disability 
       which cannot be cured. Examples include persons 
       with Alzheimer's, persons who have suffered a 
       severe stroke, or persons in the terminal stages of 
       a disease who may not be receiving active medical 
       treatment. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 825.114. 
 
The district court reasoned that there are two plausible 
readings of the term "serious health condition" under the 
interim rule, one which encompasses Victorelli's condition 
and one which does not. It therefore found the interim rule 
ambiguous and appealed to the legislative history and the 
final regulation for guidance. The district court interpreted 
the final regulation and legislative history to suggest that 
Victorelli's ulcer was the type of condition that Congress 
intended "to be treated pursuant to an employer's sick 
leave policy." (R & R 13). For that reason, the court found 
SS (b)(1) and (b)(2) to be inapplicable. The district court 
concluded that it is "clear" neither the Secretary of Labor 
nor the Congress intended the FMLA to cover "minor 
ulcers" like Victorelli's. 
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We disagree. We conclude that the district court 
construed the requirements of the interim final rule too 
narrowly. Our construction of the interim final rule 
convinces us that there is a material issue as to whether 
Victorelli suffered from a "serious health condition." 
Moreover, even if we consider the provisions of thefinal 
regulation, we find that it neither states nor implies that 
Victorelli's ulcer could not meet the requirements of a 
"serious health condition." 
 
1. Application of the Interim Final Rule: 
 
Under the interim final rule, subsection (b)(1) requires 
that a person be treated for an illness "two or more times 
by a health care provider." Victorelli's condition satisfies 
(b)(1) because she was treated by Dr. Adoki for her ulcer 
two times prior to her termination, in addition to being 
treated several times after her termination. Alternatively, 
subsection (b)(2) requires that a person be treated for a 
condition on at least one occasion and be subject to 
"continuing treatment" by a health care provider thereafter. 
Continuing treatment includes a course of medication or 
therapy. Victorelli's condition satisfies (b)(2), because she 
was treated by Dr. Adoki on at least one occasion and 
subsequently received continuing treatment by medication 
for her condition. 
 
We find that this construction of subsections (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) is neither improper nor unduly "expansive." In 
addition, we note that the district court at no time 
addressed whether subsection (b)(3) applied to Victorelli's 
condition. 
 
Subsection (b)(3) requires that the employee be under the 
continuing supervision of, but not necessarily active 
treatment by, a health care provider. The facts indicate that 
Victorelli has been under the continuing supervision of a 
health care provider, Dr. Adoki, since March 16, 1988. He 
has seen her on numerous occasions for gastritis and for 
symptoms of peptic ulcer disease, and he has prescribed 
Zantac for her condition. 
 
Subsection (b)(3) also requires that the health condition 
be long-term, chronic or incurable. There is evidence that 
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Victorelli's peptic ulcer disease appears to be a long-term or 
chronic condition. Victorelli has suffered from this 
condition on a recurring basis since November 1992. Dr. 
Adoki has also stated that, while manageable with 
medication and treatment, Victorelli's condition is 
incurable. It should also be noted that, while Shadyside 
Hospital contested the status of Victorelli's condition, it did 
not attempt to obtain certification of her medical condition 
in the form of second or third opinions, as is its right under 
FMLA regulations. 29 C.F.R. S 825.307. Additionally, Janet 
Lattanzio, Victorelli's supervisor, indicated that not only did 
she not dispute the plaintiff's medical condition but she 
took no steps to find out whether Victorelli indeed had a 
peptic ulcer condition. In fact, at no time did Shadyside 
present any testimony or evidence challenging the medical 
adequacy of Victorelli's FMLA claim. 
 
We believe the district court was correct in thefirst 
instance when it suggested that the plaintiff couldfit within 
the requirements of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the 
interim rule. We do not agree, however, that it is"clear" 
that such an interpretation would be an expansive reading 
of the regulations. In addition, there is evidence in the 
record to support a finding that Victorelli's condition 
satisfies the requirements of subsection (b)(3). As such, 
Victorelli has demonstrated a material issue of fact as to 
whether she suffered from a "serious health condition." 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that it was 
premature to award summary judgment to Shadyside on 
Victorelli's FMLA claim.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that courts in other circuits addressing similar FMLA claims 
have found questionably serious health conditions sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment. See Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 1997 WL 353605 
(7th Cir. June 27, 1991) (finding that multiple diagnoses and 
examinations for ailments only temporally related to one another 
sufficient ground upon which to overturn summary judgment motion in 
order to further develop record to determine whether serious health 
condition existed); Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 956 
F. Supp. 1239, 1254 (D. Md. 1997) (finding that episodic periods of 
incapacity involving the inability to breathe freely due to asthma and 
concurrent migraine headaches were sufficient to preclude summary 
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 2. "Serious Health Condition" 
       as viewed by the Final Rule: 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the district court referred to the 
final rule in concluding that Victorelli did not have a 
"serious health condition." The district court found that 
Victorelli had a "minor ulcer," citing language in the final 
rule that precludes FMLA protection to "minor ulcers." 29 
C.F.R. S 825.114. While the final rule does state that 
"unless complications arise" "minor ulcers" are not covered 
by the FMLA, the final rule fails to indicate what 
"complications" distinguish a "serious" ulcer from a "minor" 
one. 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 at 2195. Nevertheless, the 
requirements of the final rule are helpful to our analysis. 
 
The final rule, like the interim rule, requires either 
inpatient care or continuing treatment. 29 C.F.R. S 825.114. 
We find, as did the district court, that the applicable 
provision is S 825.114(b), which states: 
 
        (2) Continuing treatment by a health care provider. A 
       serious health condition involving continuing treatment 
       by a health care provider includes any one of the 
       following: 
 
       (i) A period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work, 
       attend school or perform other regular daily 
       activities due to the serious health condition, 
       treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more 
       than three consecutive calendar days, and any 
       subsequent treatment or period of incapacity 
       relating to the same condition, that also involves: 
 
         (A) Treatment two or more times by a health care 
       provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
judgment as to whether serious health condition existed); McClain v. 
Southwest Steel Co., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 295, 298-300 (N.D. Okl. 1996) 
(finding summary judgment inappropriate where plaintiff attributed 
absenteeism to chronic nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, severe headaches, 
dizziness and/or lightheadedness as symptoms might constitute a 
serious health problem); Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 
827-28 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (finding that plaintiff's absences which were 
attributed to migraine headaches raise a material issue as to whether 
she had a serious health condition). 
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       direct supervision from a health care provider, or 
       by a provider of health care services (e.g., a 
       physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral 
       by, a health care provider; or 
 
         (B) Treatment by a health care provider on at 
       least one occasion which results in a regimen of 
       continuing treatment under the supervision of the 
       health care provider. 
 
       (ii) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or 
       for prenatal care. 
 
       (iii) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such 
       incapacity due to a chronic serious health 
       condition. A chronic serious health condition is one 
       which: 
 
         (A) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a 
       health care provider, or by a nurse or physicians 
       assistant under direct supervision of a health care 
       provider; 
 
         (B) Continues over an extended period of time 
       (including recurring episodes of a single underlying 
       condition) and; 
 
         (C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing 
       period of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, 
       epilepsy, etc.). 
 
Victorelli's peptic ulcer disease does not meet the 
requirements under (2)(i) or (2)(ii). There is, however, 
evidence that Victorelli's peptic ulcer disease may satisfy 
the test for a chronic serious health condition under (2)(iii).5 
First, Victorelli's multiple visits to Dr. Adoki for her peptic 
ulcer disease fit the language of (2)(iii)(A). Second, the three 
year duration of Victorelli's condition constitutes an 
extended period of time under (2)(iii)(B). Third, Victorelli's 
periods of incapacity have been episodic rather than 
continuous commensurate with (2)(iii)(C).6  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Coincidentally, subsection (2)(iii) is the corresponding provision to 
section (b)(3) of the interim final rule. 
 
6. That Victorelli's periods of incapacity have been episodic may be 
attributable to her on-going course of medication. 
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After comparing the interim and the final rules, we note 
that the standard for "continuing treatment" has remained 
unchanged. "The regulation also retains the concept that 
continuing treatment includes either two visits to a health 
care provider or one visit followed by continuing treatment 
by under the supervision of a health care provider." 60 Fed. 
Reg. 2180 at 2195. We also note that the regimen of 
continuing treatment includes the taking of prescribed 
medication, as Victorelli has done. Moreover, the 
Department of Labor, in promulgating the final rule, 
maintained the same standards for meeting the 
requirements of a long-term, chronic condition."Therefore, 
. . . as under the interim final rule, it is only necessary that 
the patient be under the supervision of a health care 
provider, rather than receiving active treatment." Id. 
 
In response to the district court's reliance upon 
legislative history for the proposition that "minor ulcers" do 
not constitute a "serious health condition," we note that the 
non-exclusive "laundry list" of applicable "serious" 
conditions, compiled by Congress, was not included in the 
final rule because the Department of Labor determined that 
the existence of such a list might cause employers to make 
incorrect decisions in applying the FMLA. "[T]heir inclusion 
may lead employers to recognize only conditions on the list 
or to second guess whether a condition is equally `serious,' 
rather than apply the regulatory standard" (emphasis 
added). 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 at 2195. We also note that many 
of the conditions, which Congress had described as a 
"serious health condition," are conditions that, as long as 
they are being treated, do not impede a person's ability to 
work. 
 
Therefore, from our review of the final regulations, we 
conclude that Congress did not intend to deny FMLA 
protection to an employee simply because her doctor was 
able to mitigate the frequency of her discomfort or 
incapacity. The intent of the FMLA is not simply to protect 
those whose condition causes continual incapacity. It is 
also intended to protect those who are occasionally 
incapacitated by an on-going medical problem.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Department recognizes that certain conditions, such as asthma 
and diabetes, continue over an extended period of time (i.e. from several 
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We find that there is sufficient evidence in the record so 
that Victorelli may be able to meet the "regulatory 
standard." A factfinder may be able reasonably to find that 
Victorelli suffers from something more severe than a "minor 
ulcer" and as such is entitled to FMLA protection. For this 
reason, there is a material issue of fact whether Victorelli 
suffered a "serious health condition" as interpreted under 
both the interim and the final rule. 
 
B. Cause for Termination 
 
The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees who request FMLA protected leave. 29 
U.S.C. S 2615(a). Specifically, it prevents employers from 
denying employment to employees once they return from an 
FMLA leave period. Any such denial by the employer is 
actionable under the FMLA. Id. The record indicates that, 
had it not been for her July 29 absence, Victorelli would 
not have been terminated. 
 
       Q. Was there no other procedure in the works, no 
       other unresolved problems, nothing pending that 
       would have caused her termination on August 1st, 
       1994, even if she had worked her complete shift 
       July 29th, 1994? 
 
       A. Not unless something would have happened while 
       she was at work. 
 
       Q. I understand that. But assuming she worked her 
       shift without incident on July 29th, 1994, and she 
       did work apparently without incident on July 30th 
       and half of the shift or a little more than half the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
months to many years) often without affecting day to day ability to work 
or perform other activities but may cause episodic periods of incapacity 
of less than three days. Although persons with such underlying 
conditions generally visit a health-care provider periodically, when 
subject to flare-up or other incapacitating episode, staying home and 
self-treatment are often more effective than visiting the health care 
provider (e.g., the asthma-sufferer who is advised to stay home and 
inside due to the pollen count being too high). The definition of serious 
health condition "in the rule has, therefore, been revised to include such 
conditions, even if the individual episodes of incapacity are not of more 
than three days duration." 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 at 2195. 
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       shift on August 1st, would you have had that 
       meeting. Is there any other reason that you would 
       have had the meeting at twelve o'clock and 
       terminated Kathy Victorelli? 
 
       A. No. 
 
(Lattanzio Aff., Appendix, p. 77). 
 
On remand, the district court must determine whether 
Victorelli's ulcer disease was a "serious health condition," 
whether her absence on July 29 was an FMLA leave period 
as provided by 29 U.S.C. S 2612, and whether as a 
consequence her employment termination violated the 
FMLA. 
 
IV. 
 
As for Victorelli's motion for summary judgment, we 
agree with the district court that Victorelli has not met her 
burden of persuading us that she deserves to prevail as a 
matter of law. The material issue of fact whether her ulcer 
was a "serious health condition" also prevents a grant of 
summary judgment in her favor. We will therefore affirm 
the district court's denial of Victorelli's motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
 
V. 
 
Because of the disputed issue of fact concerning the 
seriousness of Victorelli's health condition, we conclude 
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
to defendant, Shadyside. We will, therefore, vacate that 
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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